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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a framework to leverage
electrical microgrids and cellular networks to support post-
disaster communications for the public, government and critical
infrastructure operation. The framework involves both policy and
technical components. The proposed approach is an integration
of electrical microgrids to provide power together with self con-
figuring wireless mesh communication networks and local edge
computing infrastructure to support critical communications and
smart infrastructure services/applications in a specific geographic
area. Hence, geographic zones which are resilient safe havens
are created in a city. We outline the basic components of our
approach and discuss open challenges to realizing the vision.
Index Terms—Disaster Recovery, Cellular Networks, Micro-
grids, Smart Cities
I. INTRODUCTION
Cellular phone communications have become ubiquitous in
the developed world and are part of the critical infrastructures
upon which society depends. Furthermore cellular communica-
tion networks are being viewed as a key communication com-
ponent for smart city and Internet of things (IoT) applications
(e.g.,using LTE-M or NB-IoT). The combination of advances
in sensors, communication networks, controls, cyberphysical
systems, data integration and analytics is leading to smart
infrastructures for smart cities by improving sustainability,
efficiencies, and the quality of life of residents. Numerous
smart city systems have been proposed and testbeds have
been deployed in areas such as improving energy efficiency,
transportation systems, environmental monitoring and asset
management [1], [2]. Some specific examples are smart water
systems using wireless sensors and actuators installed in/along
water distribution networks to monitor pressure, leaks and
ruptures, water quality and optimize the flow [3] and integrated
sensors, traffic control and public transportation for intelli-
gent transportation systems [4]. As research and development
continues in the smart city infrastructure space, many new
applications are expected to emerge.
Note that these new smart infrastructures are increasingly
dependent on both electrical power and ICT. This creates new
interdependencies and vulnerabilities, especially to natural
disasters and extreme weather (e.g, hurricanes, tornados, wind
storms, ice storms, etc.). Recent studies [5] show that weather
events are the main cause of large power outages in the United
States and, in turn, power outages are a leading cause of
downtime in cellular communication networks. Furthermore,
the size and the number of power outages caused by weather
events is expected to rise as climate change increases the
intensity and frequency of extreme weather (i.e., hurricanes,
floods, blizzards, tornados, etc.) [6]. For example, according to
the US government, the annual rate of weather related events
having an economic impact of 1 billion or more, averaged
10.6 events during the time period 2012 to 2016, which is
a sharp increase from the long term average of 5.64 events
per year over 1980 to 2016. Such extreme weather events
typically result in long power outages lasting days or even
weeks severely impacting society in general. This is illustrated
by the recent 2017 hurricane Maria impact on the island of
Puerto Rico, where electrical power, cellular communications
and water distribution systems were impacted for weeks.
In general, cellular communications networks have proven
to be fragile in the face of natural disasters leading to recent
work on post disaster networks [7] and techniques to make
networks more robust to disasters [8]. However, theses works
primarly concentrate on the communication network in iso-
lation, ignoring the need for power or assuming temporary
solutions (e.g., batteries, cells on wheels) are sufficient. Thus
far, little work has appeared on improving the survivability and
resilience of critical infrastructure in a smart city context. In
this paper, we propose a framework to address the problem
of providing resilient power and ICT to support smart in-
frastructure applications under natural disaster conditions. Our
approach is a combination of a multi-user electrical microgrid
to provide power together with cellular based communications
dynamically reconfigured into a mesh network and local edge
computing resources to support critical smart infrastructure
services/applications in a specific geographic area. The goal is
to create geographic districts within a city that are safe havens
with critical services functioning at a degraded but acceptable
level of service in the face of extreme conditions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present our proposed architectural framework followed by
details on microgrids, cellular based wireless mesh networks
and support for the smart infrastructures during disaster sce-
narios. Section III presents results on microgrid costs. Lastly,
section IV presents our conclusions and future work.
II. RESILIENT POWER AND COMMUNICATIONS
FRAMEWORK
We consider a scenario where a natural disaster has resulted
in a power outage of size and duration such that commercial
cellular networks have outages and the smart infrastructures
which depend on a steady supply of electricity as well as
cellular communication services are adversely affected. The
cellular network outage maybe due to the failures of base
stations and/or the backhaul network and/or associated core
network services (e.g., authentication, mobility management,
synchronization, etc.). Note, that while some cell sites may
have backup batteries (typically 4 to 8 hours of power) or
diesel gensets, they cannot provide service without backhaul
network connectivity and core network services (this was ob-
served in 2012 hurricane Sandy in New Jersey where powered
base stations could not provide service due to flooded backhaul
equipment resulting in isolation from the core network). Here
we propose to use edge computing devices together with dy-
namic reconfiguring of powered cellular network base stations
across operators including pooling the available spectrum to
form a multihop ad hoc mesh network which can provide local
disaster communication services to the public, government and
smart infrastructures.
The components of our framework are illustrated in Figure
1. There are two major pieces: (1) a multi-user microgrid and
(2) a disaster recovery cellular based communication network
that is organized into a multihop wireless mesh network. We
discuss them in turn below.
Fig. 1. Architecture Framework
A. Microgrids
Microgrids are essentially small scale power systems usually
on the medium to low voltage distribution feeder that include
distributed generation together with protection devices and
possibly energy storage [9]. Microgrids have been proposed
as a method to provide continuity of power to key commercial
and societal locations, (e.g., military installations, hospitals).
Also, microgrids have been touted as a mechanism to facilitate
the incorporation of distributed renewable energy generation,
such as solar and wind, into the grid and modernize the power
grid in an incremental fashion. The functional building blocks
of microgrids include the electrical switches and protection to
connect to/from the main power grid, interconnected electrical
loads and a local energy supply (e.g., fuel cells, renewables,
diesel gensets).
The basic requirements for microgrids are to operate in
a stand-alone mode (i.e., the so called island mode) and a
main grid connected mode. In the island mode, the microgrid
operates on local sources of energy with the local microgrid
control system providing voltage and frequency (in the case of
AC) stability for optimal power flows, and ensuring minimal
load shedding and disruption during transitions from the main
power grid connected to the island mode.
Figure 2 shows a high level view of a microgrid, illustrat-
ing the local power sources and the electrical loads, which
are grouped into classes based on their importance, namely,
mission critical loads, mission priority loads, and non-critical
loads. Note, the power generated or stored in a microgrid
must equal the electrical load, and hence, depending on the
power available in island mode, some classes of load may
not be served, such as, non-critical loads and some mission
priority loads. Further, the microgrid must have the ability to
transition back from the island mode to main grid connected
mode, resulting in re-synchronization with minimum impact
to critical loads during the mode transition periods. In the
connected mode, the microgrid acts as a supplemental power
source to the main grid. Here we adopt the US Department
of Energy’s definition of a microgrid in that it is a single
controllable entity with respect to the main power grid.
As listed in Figure 1, microgrids have several defining
characteristics. First is the size of the microgrid in terms of
power generation and storage. The majority of current and
proposed industrial size microgrids are in the 1.5 - 40 MW
range. Traditionally microgrids have a fixed boundary and are
designed to provide sufficient power to support mission critical
loads within the geographic boundary utilizing their local
generation and storage facilities. If the microgrid has surplus
power available, less important loads can be powered or the
microgrid can act as a virtual feeder picking up nearby mission
critical loads outside the boundary [10]. However, the virtual
feeder operation requires determining feasible paths to connect
to the load using automated feeder switches. In addition to the
size of the microgrid, the geographic location of the microgrid
and the loads it must power to enable specific specific smart
city applications must be determined. In general the microgrid
power source and energy storage should be located close to
the loads in order to minimize the distribution line loss.
Another characteristic of microgrids is the type of power
generated (i.e., AC, DC or mix of AC and DC), how the
power is distributed (AC or DC) and the associated load
requirements (AC, DC or mix). For example, some renewables
energy sources, such as solar, produce DC power that must be
converted to AC for AC loads. In general, conversion (e.g.,
AC/DC) is inefficient due to power losses and should be
minimized. Regulatory policies are a major issue in regards
to microgrids as they can restrict ownership, confine the
type of connection to the main grid and limit the power
generation size. For example, some states forbid the local
utility from owning and operating microgrids and put limits
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on the maximum size of microgrids to avoid regulation.
A major hurdle to the deployment of microgrids are the
economic barriers in terms of cost to own and operate an
industrial scale microgrid. Traditionally microgrids are owned
and operated by a single entity. In [11], the authors propose
a resilient DC microgrid using renewable energy (wind +
solar) to power a cluster of nearby LTE cellular base stations.
However, the cost of tens of small microgrids just to power a
cellular network throughout a city during power outages is pro-
hibitive. Given the non-linear economics of microgrids[12], we
propose mult-user microgrids be deployed such that the cost is
shared by the smart infrastructure owners with mission critical
loads (e.g., water system, cellular networks), societal important
locations with mission critical loads (e.g., hospital), and the
local government (police, fire, 911 service) that will utilize
the communication network powered by the microgrid for
public safety communications. This would provide government
sponsored options for financing industrial sized microgrids,
but may require regulatory changes in many juristrictions to
enable multi-user microgrids.
B. Communication Network
The other component in the framework of Figure 1 is
the disaster recovery communication network. In most large
cities, there are multiple LTE cellular network operators with
overlapping coverage as shown in Figure 3 with two operators.
We propose to leverage this communication network landscape
to enable smart infrastructures to communicate between their
mission critical components in order to maintain full or partial
operation. Further, we intend to size and locate the microgrid
so that it can power both mission critical smart infrastructure
components and a set of geographically nearby base stations.
Note, the LTE network architecture can be divided into
two main parts namely: (1) the access network and (2) the
core network. The access network consist of the base stations
termed evolved NodeBs (eNBs) in LTE. The core network
consists of a variety of components, namely: mobility manage-
ment entity (MME), serving gateway (S-GW), packet gateway
(P-GW), policy charging rules function (PCRF), and home
subscriber service HSS). The core network component provide
services related to mobility, security, billing, addressing and
connection to data and circuit-switched networks. Cellular
networks are not particularly robust since if the access portion
of the network is disconnected from the core network, the
access network is unable to provide service. Hence, even if
the base stations are undamaged and are supplied power from
the microgrid after a disaster event, they will not be able to
provide service if they have lost backhaul connection to the
core network or core network is down due to the disaster event.
Fig. 3. Typical cellular network topology
In this work, we propose to form a software defined network
(SDN) using any undamaged eNB base stations in order to
maintain LTE based local communication service to the user
equipments (UEs) and the LTE-based smart infrastructure
sensor/machines within range. The basic idea is to reconfigure
the base stations powered by the microgrid to form a multi-
hop wireless mesh network (WMN) as illustrated in Figure 4.
The basic components needed to form the WMN are shown
in Figure 1 and are discussed below.
1) Reconfigurable-eNB: In order to form the WMN, we
propose to modify the eNB base stations to Reconfigurable-
eNB (ReNB) that have the ability to create a local serving radio
access network without backhaul communications to the core
network. The ReNB will be equipped with SDN functionality
and multiple radio transmitters to support the creation of radio
links between neighboring base stations, which maybe owned
by different network operators. The ReNB will need to support
radio management (i.e., MIMO configurations, power levels,
etc.) of the links between base stations as well as links to
UEs within coverage range. Also, the ReNB should support
direct device-to-device (D2D) communication [13] in order
to extend the cellular coverage through multiple UE hops to
the ReNB. Similarly, D2D can be used to extend the cellular
coverage through multiple UE hops for smart infrastructures
components that are within range of each other.
2) Spectrum Allocation: Consider that a subset of cellular
network base stations from different operators on different
frequency bands maybe be powered within the microgrid
boundary. In the absence of the backhaul connections, we
propose to pool the available licensed spectrum bands and
reallocate the spectrum to support the wireless mesh network.
In particular, some spectrum bands are used to support com-
munication links between ReNB base stations, other bands
are allocated to optimize coverage and performance. For
example, Figure 4 shows a WMN powered by a microgrid.
The shaded rectangular area denotes the geographic boundary
of the microgrid and the lines between base stations indicate
point to point wireless links. The base stations are a mix of
small and large cells and may include new technology such
as LTE-U and small 5G cells. If the larger base stations in
the WMN are assigned higher frequency band spectrum for
serving users (e.g., 1.9 GHz), then the coverage area would
be the area indicated by the red cloud. However, if a lower
spectrum band (e.g., 700MHz) is assigned to the larger base
stations, the geographic coverage area will be larger as shown
by the blue cloud in the figure. Note that in both cases, the
radio coverage area is larger than the geographic boundary
of the microgrid, and thus, the network can provide service
to devices outside the microgrid boundary if those devices
have sufficient battery power or a local power source. This is
especially important for public safety applications using cell
phones.
In general, there are several options for pooled spectrum
allocation among the base stations. This can be done on the
basis of specific preplanned scenarios, or a dynamic assign-
ment can be made based on the scenario in hand (e.g., which
base stations are operable, interference levels, capabilities of
base stations, etc.). In order for the concept of spectrum
pooling and reallocation of licensed spectrum to be viable,
government policy and regulation must support this from a
legal standpoint for disaster situations. Besides the licensed
spectrum, we propose to also use unlicensed spectrum with
technologies such as LTE−U, LAA, and IEEE 802.11 WiFi
offloading when possible.
Fig. 4. Cellular Mesh Network
3) Reconfiguration: One of the main functions of the
ReNB is the ability to dynamically form a wireless mesh
network during a disaster event. Rather than embed all the
core network functions in the ReNB which would be cost
prohibitive, we propose adding the minimum functions to the
ReNB to form communication channels and routing in the
case of emergencies. All other functions will be implemented
into a specific server that we name the Software Defined
Emergency Communication Network Controller (SDECNC).
When the ReNB moves to the emergency mode, it will utilize a
network reconfiguration protocol. The reconfiguration protocol
supports the discovery of neighbor nodes and the establishment
of radio links between neighbors forming a mesh network and
contacting the SDECNC. A number of neighbor discovery
protocols exists that could be adopted or modified for this
use. The basic procedure involves scanning frequencies for
a beacon from other nodes and responding, or failing that,
transmitting a beacon/hello signal followed by listening for
a response followed by performing a handshake and the
frequency assignment to establish a link. Once the ad hoc
network has been formed, a routing protocol will be needed
for connections that span multiple wireless hops. This routing
protocol would be installed using the SDECNC which will act
as the SDN controller. There are several routing protocols in
the literature for wireless mesh networks that can be adopted
here, such as AODV (Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector),
Associativity-Based Routing (ABR) [14], and B.A.T.M.A.N.
(Better Approach To Mobile Adhoc Networking). Note that
the UE should preceive the service as standard LTE service in
normal forms (i.e., unicast, multicast, broadcast) and does not
need any special equipment or software.
4) Software Defined Emergency Communication Network
Controller (SDECNC): The SDECNC will act as the SDN
controller for the ad-hoc network formed by the ReNBs. Once
the ReNB discovers all its neighbors, it advertises them to all
its neighbors (similar to Link State Advertising). Simultane-
ously an the SDECNC controller will send a LSA to all its
neighbors about it being assigned the controller. The controller
by means of LSA will know about the neighbors to which each
ReNB can be connected by establishment of a link. The use
of SDN concepts eliminates the creation of unnecessary links
between the different ReNBs. The SDECNC is a server that
encompasses additional functions usually performed by the
core network and other auxiliary services. For example, the
SDECNC would perform authentication/security management,
timing services such as PTP based clock synchronization
for ReNBs, mobility management, PSAP processing, DNS,
etcetra. The SDECNC requires a steady supply of power and
a wired or wireless connectivity to some base stations in
the WMN. Hence, the ENCS should be located within the
geographic boundary of the microgrid. The SDECNC will
maintain control signaling connections to ReNB and UEs in
a fashion to the S1-MME connections in LTE.
5) Virtual Networks : A virtual network (VN) refers to a
class of service that uses a shared network infrastructure to
emulate the characteristics of a private network. The virtual
network must appear to the users as a fully functional network.
The primary motivation behind implementing VNs is to obtain
different service levels such as bandwidth, security, QoS, or
availability. In [15], a framework was proposed to prioritize
network traffic adaptively for smart cities using a software-
defined network (SDN) approach, where services that require
Fig. 5. Virtual Networks
priority are placed in virtualized networks and the mechanism
is accomplished through a priority management layer in the
SDN architecture. Here, we suggest the use of VNs in the
wireless mesh network in order to prioritize and tailor services
to different smart infrastructure and smart city applications.
The services will be pre-classified according to the impor-
tance of the VN application. The SDECNC will act as the
SDN controller here. For example, in Figure 5, public safety
communication and smart infrastructure communications are
each given a dedicated virtual network. The public safety
communication virtual network VN2 can be designed to have
higher reliability and fault tolerance than normal communica-
tions over the WMN, whereas, virtual network VN1 supporting
smart water system communications is given real-time delay
guarantees.
III. MICROGRID EVALUATION
In this section, we demonstrate how a multi-user microgrid
sharing power over critical smart infrastructures can be cost-
effective. Here, we study microgrid cost sharing within a
geographic area that has a hospital, water treatment plant
and LTE base stations. First, we start by determining the
power consumption for each infrastructure, beginning with the
hospital. According to Schneider Electric [16], annual energy
consumption can be found by using the number of beds in the
hospital (KWh/Bed) as follows:
PH = N ∗ UX(kWh) (1)
where, PH is the power consumption for hospital X with
N beds and UX is the average bed power consumption in
kWh. In this case, we consider a hospital with total bed size
of 300, which will result in overall 24000 kWh/d in power
consumption.
We consider a water treatment plant that cleans seawater
or brackish river/lagoon water for consumer use. According
to American Authority in Membrane Treatment [18], the
minimum amount of energy required to desalinate average
seawater is approximately 3.8 kilowatt-hours per thousand
gallons (kWh/kgal). Therefore, we can estimate the average
power consumption of a water treatment as follows:
PW (kWh) = WX(gallon)/1000 ∗ 3.8(kWh/kgal) (2)
where, WX is the total water processed. Here, we consider a
medium size city of population 300,000 that consumes 22.5
million gallons of water per day.
For LTE base stations, we use the average annual power
consumption per base station as given in [19] as ≈ 8000kwh/d.
Table I summarizes the power consumption for the infrastruc-
tures.
We utilized the HOMER microgrid simulation [?] and
design software to estimate microgrid costs. In each case we
designed a single line diagram microgrid that includes a mix
of diesel generators, DC/AC converters, photovoltaic cells,
wind turbines, and 1 KW lithium acid batteries for storage.
We considered powering each infrastructure with an individual
microgrid and compared that to a single multi-user microgrid
that can power all three infrastructures. Table II shows the
result for this simulation; the first column reflects total load
for each infrastructure. The second column indicates the net
present cost, which includes (capital, replacement, salvage,
operating and maintenance, and fuel) with project lifetime of
25 years.
The main parameters to be included here is the cost of
energy, and by multiplying that with the whole electricity
consumption, we measure the total power cost for each in-
frastructure as shown in the last column in the table.
By adding the total cost of each infrastructure that powered
by a separate microgrid and compares it with the total value
of each infrastructure that all powered by one microgrid, we
noticed that the sharing one significant microgrid components
are preferred in term of cost compare to the stand-alone small
individual microgrid.
TABLE I
POWER CONSUMPTION
Result Hospital Water Plant LTE Base stations
Size 300 beds 8 million Gallon 10
Power (kWh/d) 24000 30000 8000
TABLE II
SIMULATION RESULT
Pittsburgh, PA
Load (kwh/d) NPC COE OC power kwh/y Cost/y
LTE BSs 8000 16 0.425 1.1 2920000 1241000
Hospital 24000 46 0.419 3.5 8760000 3670440
WWTP 30000 58 0.416 4.2 10950000 4555200
Total sharing 62000 117 0.411 8.7 22630000 9300930
Total Non-sharing 62000 120 - 8.8 21389000 9466640
Next we increased the number of base stations powered by
the microgrid in steps of ten from 10 to 40 in figure 6. The
graph shows the different in cost between the sharable power
source and non-sharable power source. Observe that the shared
microgrid is always preferred over using a stand-alone power
source for each load since result in less cost.
Next we increased the number of base stations powered by
the microgrid in steps of ten from 10 to 40 in figure 6. The
Fig. 6. Power Cost
graph shows the different in cost between the sharable power
source and non-sharable power source. Observe that the shared
microgrid is always preferred over using a stand-alone power
source for each load since result in less cost.
A. Smart Infrastructures
As noted early the purpose of our proposed framework
is to provide power and communications support to smart
infrastructures such as water systems so that they may continue
to operate in a district of a city. This requires identifying
the mission critical electrical loads for the infrastructure and
the necessary ICT support for operation. The mission critical
loads can be determined by examining the infrastructure in
question and can be connected to the microgrid for power. In
terms of the ICT support the WMN can provide connectivity
within the geographic boundary of the microgrid and nearby
locations. However smart infrastructures will typically include
a control and back end data analytic center. Hence either the
some mission critical portion of the control and back end
data analytic center functions must be provided by a local
edge computing center located within the microgrid boundary
or the WMN must provide connectivity to the main center
which should have it’s own power source. Determining what
functions should be provided locally or the feasibility of
connection to the normal control center will depend on the
particular infrastructure and is one area of our future work.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a framework to provide power and
communications support to smart city critical infrastructures.
The framework advocates the use of microgrids to power
smart city critical infrastructures within a specific district
of a city. Furthermore, we propose to use the microgrid to
power the cellular network base stations located within the
microgrid boundary and reconfigure them into a standalone
wireless mesh network that operates in a multi-hop fashion.
This is facilitated by pooling different operators spectrum
bands to be shared in case of emergencies and the use of
an emergency communication network server to provide core
network functions. We also proposed a reconfigurable eNB
that has the capabilities to communicate with other ReNBs to
create the wireless mesh network and the use of SDN based
virtual networks to seperate different services/users and tailor
quality of service. A detailed analysis of the ad hoc wireless
mesh network and where to locate the microgrid to provide
the greatest benefit to a city are future work topics.
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